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Introduction
In 2007, The Mothers of Srebrenica, an organization which represents 6,000 women whose 
family members were massacred at Srebrenica in 1995, filed a civil action in the District Court of 
the Hague against the United Nations (UN) and the Dutch Government. The Mothers of 
Srebrenica trial brought international attention to the role in which UN peacekeepers stationed 
at Srebrenica played in the massacre of over 8,000 Bosniak men and boys by the Bosnian Serb 
Army (VRS) under the command of General Mladić.  During the same period, the actions of 1
peacekeepers in Rwanda, particularly those of Lieutenant Luc Lemaire, who by withdrawing 
the 90 UN troops under his command, abandoned 2,000 Tutsi refugees to be murdered by the 
Interahamwe,  begged the question of what role UN peacekeepers played in the genocides.  2 3
Were the UN peacekeepers helpless bystanders or were they a culpable party that had the 
ability to stop massacres but instead made a conscious decision to allow them to take place?
This article reanalyzes both the situational and operational factors on the ground that 
influenced the decisions of UN peacekeepers during their deployments in Srebrenica and 
Rwanda. By approaching these events from a mental health perspective, it is shown that there 
are numerous factors which gravely impacted the mental state of UN peacekeepers. These 
factors, when combined with the operational limitations which peacekeepers faced, were 
ultimately detrimental to their ability to take any serious action to prevent genocide from taking 
place. I take a more in-depth look at the aspects of their experiences which the peacekeepers 
themselves report as significant or defining factors of their deployment and analyze them using 
the diagnostic questions asked of returning veterans found in the Deployment Risk and 
Resilience Inventory (DRRI-2) Scales.  The DRRI-2 Scales are an instrument used to assess 4
veterans’ risk of or resilience against developing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
following their deployment. The use of these scales will aid in shedding new light on the daily 
conditions that the UN peacekeepers operated under and which only eyewitnesses who lived 
these experiences can describe how they impacted their mental wellbeing and the agency they 
felt they could exercise. This article sheds light on previously under-explored stressors that 
 “UN and the Netherlands Are Sued Over Srebrenica Killings,” The New York Times, June 4, 2007, accessed November 8, 1
2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/04/world/europe/04iht-serbs.4.5992698.html.
 The Interahamwe was one of the extremist groups, comprised of younger men, who participated in the Rwandan 2
Genocide. See Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2002), 54.
 Journalist Chris McGreal pinpoints one of the key arguments against UN peacekeeping in Rwanda and Bosnia. He 3
states “[t]here were good reasons to question the point of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s and to wonder if it was 
not costing as many lives as it was protecting by offering an illusion of security. The murdered Tutsis at the school 
might have stood a better chance if they had fled to Uganda.” This typifies the criticism that UN enclaves in fact 
did not provide an area where refugees could expect safety, but instead concentrated them to make them an even 
easier target for the perpetrators who knew that the UN peacekeepers protecting their targets would not open fire 
on them due to the rules of engagement dictated to them by the UN high command. See Chris McGreal, “What's 
the Point of Peacekeepers When They Don't Keep the Peace?: From Rwanda to Bosnia, Haiti to Congo, Failures 
Raise Questions About Future of United Nations Blue Helmets,” The Guardian, September 17, 2015, accessed 
November 4, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/17/un-united-nations-peacekeepers-
rwanda-bosnia.
 To view the diagnostic questions used to understand soldiers' experiences before, during and after deployment, please 4
refer to Dawne Vogt et al., Deployment Risk and Resilience Inventory-2 (DRRI-2) (Boston: National Center for 
Posttraumatic Disorder (PTSD), 2012), accessed November 27, 2019, https://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/
assessment/documents/DRRI2scales.pdf.
Elizabeth Mason. “Failure to Protect?: Applying the DRRI-2 Scales to Rwanda and Srebrenica.” Genocide Studies and 
Prevention 14, no. 3, 27–47. https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.3.1741. 
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would have influenced the heavily criticized decisions of both UN commands in Rwanda and 
Srebrenica in not doing more to prevent injury or death to civilians.
Before discussing at length the impact which the specific conditions of their deployment 
had on the agency of UN peacekeepers in Bosnia and Rwanda, it is important to outline the 
orders which dictated their actions and which they were expected to carry out as soldiers no 
matter the conditions they faced. For the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 
Srebrenica, their mandate was outlined in three UN Resolutions: Resolution 819—issued April 
16, 1993, Resolution 824—issued May 6, 1993, and Resolution 836—issued June 4, 1993. These 
resolutions outline that the UN peacekeepers were to ensure that Srebrenica and the 
surrounding area be established as a safe zone  where the ill and wounded could be transported 5
from and to ensure both through forces on the ground and through negotiations undertaken at 
higher levels that humanitarian aid could reach the enclave unhindered.  In Resolution 836, the 6
security council also condemned all efforts by the Bosnian Serb forces to ethnically cleanse the 
city of Bosniaks.  Therefore, the mandate for UN troops in Srebrenica was to protect the safe 7
zone, to ensure that humanitarian aid was able to reach the safe zone and it was implied, 
although not explicitly stated that UN troops should prevent evacuations of civilians by 
Bosnian Serb forces.  Finally, only in the last resolution issued, UN Security Council (UNSC) 8
Resolution 836, were UN troops authorized to use force in Bosnian safe zones. Use of force was 
only authorized in cases of self defense, in response to bombardment or armed incursion of the 
safe zone by any party involved, or if those parties obstructed the transport of supplies to safe 
zones.9
Particularly for the peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, the growing political concerns of 
the UN, which will be discussed at greater length later in this article, played a decisive role in 
the creation of both situational and operational factors which compromised the success of UN 
peacekeepers in carrying out their missions and ultimately put them at greater risk. Initially, the 
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) established in October 1993, was 
deployed to see that the Arusha Peace Agreement was adhered to.  This mission was a 10
challenge for peacekeepers from the beginning due to the presence of Hutu-extremist elements 
in Rwanda, the political instability of the Hutu-ran government, and doubts within the UN that 
the Rwandan government could successfully implement a transitional government.  The early 11
Arusha peacekeeping mission was tied to political progress and peacekeepers on the ground 
were confronted by early 1994, with a rapidly devolving political situation culminating in the 
assassination of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana on April 6, 1994, reigniting civil 
war.  With the targeting and murder of Belgian peacekeepers and mounting international 12
pressure, this prompted the UN to make the decision to withdraw the bulk of UN forces in 
Rwanda on April 21, 1994.  UN troops remaining in Rwanda were mandated not only to 13
contribute to a cease-fire agreement, but to also establish safe zones and provide security for the 
humanitarian aid being delivered to civilians. Most pertinent to our discussion, UN forces in 
Rwanda were indeed mandated, unlike in Srebrenica, to “contribute to the security and 
protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda.”14
 United Nations (UN), Security Council Resolution 819 (1993), April 16, 1993 (UN Doc. S/RES/819), 2, para. 6.5
 UN, Security Council Resolution 836 (1993), June 4, 1993 (UN Doc. S/RES/836), 3, paras. 5, 10.6
 Ibid., 1, paras. 5–6.7
 Ibid., 3, para. 9.8
 Ibid.9
 Michael Barnett, “The Politics of Indifference at the United Nations and Genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia,” in This 10
Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia, ed. Thomas Cushman and Stjepan G. Meštrović (New York: 
New York University Press, 1996), 141.
 Ibid.11
 Ibid., 142.12
 Ibid., 145.13
 UN, Security Council Resolution 918 (1994), May 17, 1994 (UN Doc. S/RES/918), 3, paras. 2–3.14
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Since its first appearance as a psychological diagnosis in 1980, PTSD has come a long 
way in terms of recognition as a diagnosis and also in its connection with earlier descriptions of 
stress-related disorders including the diagnosis of shell shock during and after World War I.  15
However, it is only with recent conflicts in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan in the early 
21st century that PTSD has become a part of the public and psychiatric discourse prompted by 
research with veterans particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom.  One 16
characteristic of PTSD is that its onset is dependent on external events. This defining feature of 
the disorder has led to a debate over the validity of PTSD as a diagnosis, questioning if the 
disorder, which originated in the context of military psychiatry, has become an overapplied 
social construct.  However, especially for historians who study war, genocide, and 17
displacement, the reciprocal relationship between the psychological factors that drive human 
agency and their impact on history demands further exploration. We would be dipping into the 
role of a psychologist if we tried to suppose knowing the inner motivations of a person. What 
we can reveal as historians are the events and pre-conditions that impact the agency of 
historical actors. By looking at decision formation and analyzing the agency of historical actors 
through the lens of mental health, historians have a new tool to understand the factors which 
impact that agency. This article analyzes the accounts given by the UN commander in Rwanda, 
Roméo Dallaire, the UN commander at the École Technique Officielle (ETO), Luc Lemaire, the 
Dutch Commander in Srebrenica, Thom Karremans, and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 
volunteers at the UN compound in Srebrenica to better understand, given the circumstances 
under which the UN peacekeepers were working, what can we as fellow human beings have 
expected from these men?
The tool that I will use to better understand the multi-layered sources of stress which 
characterized the experiences of UN personnel in Rwanda and Srebrenica are the DRRI-2 Scales. 
These scales function as a series of questions that allow veterans post-deployment to identify on 
a number scale how much or how often they were exposed to certain deployment-related 
factors. These factors either put war veterans at risk, as in, they put stress on the mental health 
of the individual, or help them to be resilient, providing mental support against developing 
PTSD.  These scales were modified in 2012 to address a wider range of both intrapersonal 18
factors, such as sexual harassment and also increased concerns, particularly for soldiers 
deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, of insurgency warfare and exposure to nuclear, biological 
and chemical agents. I have chosen the DRRI-2 Scales because it is the most detailed assessment 
of a veteran’s deployment experiences, especially in exploring the relationship with the 
development of PTSD and witnessing the consequences of war.  This includes witnessing 19
 See Nancy C. Andreasen, “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A History and a Critique,” Annals of the New York Academy of 15
Sciences 1208, no. 1 (2010), accessed May 8, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2010.05699.x.
 For a more complete overview of PTSD as a Diagnosis, please refer to Nancy Andreasen’s article cited above. Ibid.  16
 This refers to a response to the criticisms that Derek Summerfield presents in his paper where he argues that the 17
diagnosis of PTSD is currently being used by anyone who seeks to medicalize their traumatic experiences or seeks 
compensation for “relatively commonplace events” such as accidents, muggings, or difficult pregnancies. 
Summerfield even goes so far as to refer to this system as a “trauma industry.” See Derek Summerfield, “The 
Invention of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and the Social Usefulness of a Psychiatric Category,” BMJ: British 
Medical Journal 322, no. 7278 (2001), 96, accessed June 28, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.322.7278.95. However, 
Summerfield’s standpoint was highly criticized by Shalev et. al. in their article “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder” 
where they criticise any medical professional that questions the existence of a disease or disorder rather than trying 
to relieve the patient of their pain. See Arieh Y. Shalev et al., “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,” BMJ: British Medical 
Journal 322, no. 7297 (2001), 1302, accessed November 21, 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25467014. 
 Dawne Vogt et al., “Deployment Risk and Resilience Inventory-2 (DRRI-2): An Updated Tool for Assessing 18
Psychosocial Risk and Resilience Factors Among Service Members and Veterans,” Journal of Traumatic Stress 26, no. 
6 (2013), 716–717, accessed November 27, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1002/jts.21868; Dawne Vogt et al., Manual for 
the Deployment Risk and Resilience Inventory-2 (DRRI-2): A Collection of Measures for Studying Deployment-Related 
Experiences of Military Veterans (Boston: National Center for PTSD, 2012), accessed November 27, 2019, https://
www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/assessment/documents/drri2manual.pdf.
 The other alternative for a set of risk-assessment scales would be the Critical Warzone Experiences (CWE) scales.19
© 2020    Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 3 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.3.1741.
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injury or death to civilians, mass displacement, the destruction of homes and communities, and 
the desperation of those people affected by the conflict. With their mandate to protect and 
provide relief to civilians, the UN peacekeeping forces’ reason for being there was not to combat 
an enemy force as with a soldier under normal rules of engagement, but to create the conditions 
for or help to maintain peace.  For this reason, scales which do not explore these experiences 20
would not be of use for the purposes of this research.
The revised DRRI-2 Scales were created to address the shift in warfare specifically 
experienced by the United States military in the Middle East from the Gulf Wars to the more 
recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan following September 11, 2001.  The subsequent changes 21
were to address that the sustained conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan represented a shift towards 
insurgency warfare, which involved smaller groups of paramilitaries who could be dispersed 
among the civilian population. For this reason, for troops deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
missions could quickly shift from humanitarian missions to delivering lethal force.  From this 22
brief overview of the background of the DRRI-2 Scales, there are a few obvious limitations in 
applying these scales to understand the risk and resilience factors present for UN troops in 
Rwanda and Srebrenica. The first and most obvious being that the UN rules of engagement 
limited the use of force to such a degree that it was rarely, if ever, used.  So, while their mission 23
could shift between providing humanitarian aid and protection to coming under heavy fire, UN 
troops were not at risk of causing accidental civilian deaths by mistaking them for enemy 
targets, unlike US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Another key limit in the application of the 24
DRRI-2 Scales in Rwanda and Srebrenica is that the scales do not capture to what extent 
decisions made at a higher level by UN headquarters in New York impacted the success of 
missions on the ground. The indecisiveness and lack of international support in terms of 
firepower or pressure from the UN high command and from its member states during both 
peacekeeping missions was a critical operational risk factor which amplified the isolation and 
sense of unattainability for UN troops in both locations to carry out their respective mandates to 
protect safe zones and to safeguard civilians. This lack of support of relief forces, firepower, and 
a united diplomatic and military response were not inhibiting factors, or certainly not to the 
degree seen in Rwanda and Bosnia, for the deployments focused on in either the original DRRI 
or the revised DRRI-2 Scales.
Despite these limitations, using these scales for the purpose of compiling information 
regarding the deployment experiences of UN peacekeepers suits the scales’ original intended 
function. The DRRI-2 Scales were created not as a diagnostic tool themselves, but to “provide a 
research inventory of risk and resilience measures” to assess deployment-related factors and 
what their implications are for the long-term health of veterans and servicemen.  However, 25
creating or using such a catalogue of experiences based on their implications for an individual’s 
mental wellbeing is often overlooked in historical approaches as a key force behind historical 
agency. It is these personal and unseen consequences of experiencing traumatic events that 
often give way to the large-scale events that shape history.
In Rwanda and Srebrenica, the massive operational restrictions stemming from the 
higher echelons of the UN was a decisive factor which greatly restricted the actions that UN 
peacekeepers in Rwanda and Srebrenica could take to protect civilian lives. However, what 
 Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide, 46.20
 Vogt et al., DRRI-2: An Updated Tool, 710–711.21
 Ibid.22
 Barnett, The Politics of Indifference, 154–155.23
 Though UN peacekeepers did not have a high risk of accidentally firing on and killing civilians within those limited 24
parameters, in both cases of the evacuation of the UN safe zone in Srebrenica and in Rwanda, the UN withdrawal 
from the ETO were both decisive actions which directly lead to civilians being murdered. It is beyond the scope of 
this article to compare the mental health implications of those two actions, but it is certain that UN peacekeepers 
would have felt some degree of responsibility for those civilian casualties even if they were not the perpetrators. 
 Vogt et al., Manual for the DRRI-2, 2–3.25
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remains under explored in the historical analysis of these events is how those operational 
restrictions and higher level “politics” of UN peacekeeping limited the perceived or actual 
decisions that peacekeepers could take at the time to prevent genocide. By reflecting on the 
daily conditions, experiences, and limitations described by UN commanders on the ground in 
Rwanda and Srebrenica through the questions presented in the DRRI-2 Scales, we can better 
understand their impact on agency.
The revised DRRI-2 shows six categories out of a total of seventeen which have the 
highest correlation with the development of PTSD. These are: Difficult Living and Working 
Environment (56%), Perceived Threat (55%), Postdeployment Stressors (55%), Postdeployment Social 
Support (46%), Combat Experiences (45%) and Aftermath of Battle (43%).26
For the purposes of my research, I will focus on what the DRRI defines as “mission-
related factors”—these are factors which have the potential to cause stress during a soldier's 
deployment.  Of those six critical sections, I will also limit my focus to the question sections 27
that have been discussed at length by Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire, (then) Lieutenant Luc 
Lemaire, and Colonel Thom Karremans and clearly constitute defining aspects of their 
respective deployments with the UN in Rwanda and Srebrenica.  Therefore, I will not be 28
including the section that focuses on Postdeployment Social Support, nor will I discuss the section 
on Postdeployment Stressors. Furthermore, I will not be analyzing several questions from the 
section on Combat Experiences (Section D of the DRRI-2). This is due to the fact that questions 1, 
2, 8, 12, 13, 16, and 17 of this section ask if soldiers were involved in scenarios where they fired 
their weapon, launched an assault on enemy troops or otherwise used violence to subdue a 
perceived enemy threat.  These questions are therefore irrelevant to the UN peacekeeping 29
forces in Rwanda and Srebrenica, as they were under strict orders not to use force to achieve 
their mission.  Additionally, a further four questions in this section that ask whether or not 30
soldiers witnessed a member of the unit of civilians being seriously wounded or killed are 
discussed at length under the sections Perceived Threat and The Aftermath of Battle (which has 
been identified in this article as Post-Combat Experiences and therefore will not be discussed at 
length in the Combat Experiences section). I will also note for each section discussed in this 
article, if any further questions are not relevant to this research and why, the most notable being 
questions relating to exposure to nuclear, biological and chemical agents (NBCs).
Difficult Living and Working Environment
The first section I will be exploring is Section C of DRRI-2, which focuses on the environment in 
which soldiers were deployed and the conditions of their daily lives during deployment. It is by 
analyzing the accounts of the day-to-day environment that the UN personnel in both Rwanda 
and Srebrenica had to operate in and the questions asked by DRRI-2 Scales that we can gain 
some understanding about how those conditions impacted the mental state of UN troops. 
Section C focuses on analyzing aspects of the deployment environment and living conditions 
which after a period of time would have a negative impact on someone’s mental health. These 
include questions such as: Could you sleep? Did you have enough food? Was the climate of 
deployment uncomfortable? Could you shower when needed and were you living in sanitary 
 Vogt et al., Manual for the DRRI-2, 16, table 5.26
 Ibid., 3–4.27
 Hereafter referred to as (General) Dallaire, (Lt.) Lemaire and (Col.) Karremans.28
 Vogt et al., DRRI-2, 5.29
 However, it is also noted that the CWE scales provide a condensed measure of perceived danger during deployment 30
which tended to focus more on direct exposure to combat, which also proves problematic as the UN soldiers in 
Rwanda and Srebrenica were under a strict order to not fire their weapons unless their own lives were at risk. See 
Karen-Inge Karstoft et al., “Perceived Danger During Deployment: a Rasch Validation of an Instrument Assessing 
Perceived Combat Exposure and the Witnessing of Combat Consequences in a War Zone,” European Journal of 
Psychotraumatology 9, no. 1 (2018), 3, accessed November 16, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1080/20008198.2018.1487224.
© 2020    Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 3 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.3.1741.
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conditions? Were you allowed do the things needed to get your job done? Could you get as 
much privacy as you needed?31
In Karremans’ testimony against VRS General Ratko Mladić at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in July 1996, he describes the conditions of 
the UN enclave in Srebrenica as it was cut off by the VRS blockade one year before, from April 
to July 1995.  Karremans’ testimony reveals that if he or the other Dutch soldiers in Srebrenica 32
filled out Section C of the DRRI-2, many of their responses would reflect a high degree of 
exposure to adverse conditions in their living and working environment. Karremans’ testimony 
describes an atmosphere of desperation experienced by UN troops in the final weeks before the 
forced evacuation from the Srebrenica enclave. He describes that due to the blockade, refugees 
under their care were starving and without adequate medical attention while UN troops lived 
off their combat rations for a considerable period of time.  Their ability to perform necessary 33
daily tasks such as showering or more critically, carrying out their mandate to provide aid and 
relief to Bosnian refugees were crippled by the fact that they operated without electricity for 
weeks. This lack of electricity was compounded by the fact that the Dutch battalion also 
experienced heavy rain which lead to cold, damp conditions and also several roads leading into 
the enclave became impassable.  Finally, in terms of humanitarian aid being allowed into the 34
enclave, the period between April and July of 1995, represents a distinct break with the ability to 
negotiate the entry of humanitarian aid that the UN and other relief organizations in Srebrenica 
previously enjoyed. Karremans makes it clear that the freedom of movement agreement for 
humanitarian aid decided in 1993 no longer applied to Srebrenica by this period.  This, 35
compounded with impassable roads and lack of fuel for vehicles, meant that UN troops were 
physically trapped inside the Srebrenica enclave. Furthermore, the restriction of movement 
meant that for the UN soldiers inside the enclave, there was a critical lack of supplies, of 
personnel, and also no relief troops for current UN personnel who had been trying to improvise 
under the critical conditions inside the enclave.  Finally, before Karremans’ first meeting with 36
Mladić on July 11, he acknowledges in his ICTY testimony that he and the other UN troops in 
Srebrenica had had no sleep for the previous five days. This was due to the intensified shelling 
of the city by the VRS and the resulting displacement, death and injury within the enclave and 
in the surrounding area.  With the retreat of UN troops and refugees to the Potočari enclave, 37
living conditions were very similar in that they were exceptionally overcrowded; there was little 
water in hot conditions and UN convoys which provided the only chance for medicine, food or 
even for timely evacuation on the ground, were not allowed through Bosnian-Serb blockades.38
 Ibid., 4.31
 It is important to note that Karremans’ account of the UN enclave from April to July 1995 represents a period where 32
negotiations between the UN and VRS to allow for free movement of supplies and electricity into the enclave had 
broken down. This represents a critical period where Bosnian Serb forces intentionally created a very desperate 
situation inside the enclave to leave the UN troops with no other choice but to retreat from Srebrenica. During the 
overall period of UN presence inside the enclave from 1993 to 1995, there were indeed other periods of power cuts 
and lack of supplies but often, the UN was able to negotiate humanitarian aid to be allowed back into the camp. 
The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), July 4, 1996, IT-95-18-R61, 636–637.
 Ibid.33
 Ibid., 637.34
 Ibid., 636.35
 Ibid., 637–638.36
 Ibid., 645.37
 Cedric Ryngaert, “Peacekeepers Facilitating Human Rights Violations: The Liability of the Dutch State in the ‘Mothers 38
of Srebrenica’ Cases,” Netherlands International Law Review 64 (2017), 510, accessed April 18, 2020, http://doi.org/
10.1007/s40802-017-0101-6.
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Karremans’ account of the daily conditions within the Srebrenica enclave is supported 
by various personnel with MSF.  Those working for MSF describe the logistical nightmare of 39
trying to provide food, medicine, and adequate shelter for the enclave which was critically 
overpopulated with refugees and consistently bombarded by heavy artillery fire from Bosnian-
Serb forces.  There are numerous references to the VRS barring vital humanitarian aid from 40
entering the city, amounting to as much as seventy percent of supplies not reaching the 
enclave.  MSF coordinator, Eric Stobbaerts, estimated that the city was filled with almost four 41
times its pre-war population.  He also describes that the only food available in the Muslim 42
enclaves were flour, oil, tinned meat, and powdered milk, causing severe immune and 
nutritional deficiencies.  What the MSF testimonies do is help to give an idea of how the 43
environment created by the Bosnian-Serb blockade and bombardment of the city impacted 
Karreman’s ultimate decision to allow the forcible displacement of the Muslim population from 
the city in July 1995.  It is also important to note, unlike the timeline of events in Rwanda, 44
which constituted a much shorter timeframe, the city of Srebrenica experienced these conditions 
in increased severity over a period of three years.  This of course, constitutes a prolonged 45
exposure to increasingly desperate conditions in the city as evermore refugees fled to the 
enclave, more people became injured due to shellings and a critical lack of shelter, food and 
water. The threat in Srebrenica that existed for months, if not years, prior to the UN’s 
withdrawal, was that people were being left to starve, freeze, or die of disease and the UN, due 
to the Bosnian-Serb blockade, could do little logistically to fulfil their mandate to maintain the 
safe zone.  To give an idea of just how injurious the daily conditions were to the health and life 46
were of those within the Srebrenica enclave, it was calculated by the Court of Appeals which 
retried the Mothers of Srebrenica case in 2007, that the victims of the Srebrenica massacre had a 
mere thirty percent chance of survival if they had been able to remain within the UN enclave 
after July 12, 1995.  This horrific reality of daily life in the UN enclave in Srebrenica left 47
Karremans with little choice but to withdraw on July 11. It is made clear through the MSF 
reports already discussed in this section, that Karremans and the UN personnel under his 
command faced grave challenges in protecting human life within the enclave due to the 
obstacles that were present in providing adequate humanitarian aid and adequate living 
conditions.  As will be discussed in the following section on perceived threat, the chance of 48
successfully carrying out their mandate only would have continued to decrease for 
 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) International Movement, MSF and Srebrenica:1993–2003 (MSF: 2015), 28–29, accessed 39
June 28, 2020, accessed June 28, 2020, https://www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/2019-04/
MSF%20Speaking%20Out%20Srebrenica%201993-2003_1.pdf.
 Ibid., 36–37.40
 Ibid., 40.41
 Ibid., 36.42
 For Stobbaerts’ account of the Srebrenica enclave in November of 1994, see MSF International Movement, MSF and 43
Srebrenica: 1993–2003, 36–37. For further details of the conditions regarding displaced persons at the enclave, see 
Ibid., 28–30 and 37–38.
 In addition to the overall conditions described in the previous paragraph, please see MSF's additional descriptions of 44
the VRS shelling of the city and the surrounding area and the resulting mass casualties in the days leading up to 
the UN withdrawal from Srebrenica. See Ibid., 48–49.
 Ibid., 12.45
 The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, 638. For additional information on conditions inside the camp 46
please refer to the citations in footnote 42.
 Ryngaert points out that even though the Court of Appeals put a percentage on the likelihood of survival inside the 47
enclave for the purposes of determining the state of the Netherland’s liability for damages to the victims of the 
Srebrenica massacre, this percentage should be valued as an informed estimate. It is impossible to know exactly 
what would have happened to those Bosniak men who were murdered if they had remained within the UN 
compound. See Ryngaert, Peacekeepers Facilitating, 460–461.
 The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, 638.48
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peacekeepers as and if more shelling had occurred directly targeting the enclave following the 
initial barrage on July 11.49
Regarding the conditions of the UN enclaves in Rwanda, Dallaire reported that UN 
enclaves in Kigali already began to run out of food in April.  They also reported that water was 50
an ongoing struggle as more people, especially wounded people, flooded in.  It is also evident 51
from Dallaire’s documentary, that UN safe areas, for example the one at Amahoro Stadium in 
Kigali, became, in his words, “like a concentration camp.”  Amahoro Stadium at its most 52
critical point, swelled with an estimated twelve thousand people seeking the protection of UN 
troops. Dallaire describes that people were being protected by the UN who surrounded the 
stadium, only so they could die inside due to lack of food and water.  Furthermore, Dallaire 53
described the horrendous smell which was a result of having nowhere inside the stadium for 
the dead to be buried.  For the most part, in terms of movement on the ground, UN troops in 54
Rwanda, unlike in Srebrenica, did have the freedom of movement necessary to accomplish daily 
tasks.  However, Dallaire reports that when it became clear that the United States, Canada, and 55
even the UN were not willing to lend any support to the mission in Rwanda, it gave a complete 
sense of isolation to the mission. Without any support, Dallaire reported that he felt 
surrounded.  The sense of isolation and being surrounded by the enemy that Dallaire 56
described became literal as the Interahamwe took, at one point, three sides of the city of Kigali.  57
This sense of isolation to the UN missions in both Srebrenica and Rwanda was also a critical 
factor in increasing the perceived threat to peacekeepers and will be discussed further in the 
following section.
Based on the accounts provided by Karremans and Dallaire which describe the 
conditions and environment they experienced during their respective deployments in 
Srebrenica and Rwanda, it is likely that they and other personnel under their command would 
acknowledge to having high exposure to the stressors presented in questions 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, 
and 14.  Furthermore, due to the intense shelling of both the UN enclave in Srebrenica and the 58
UN Headquarters in Kigali, Karremans, Dallaire, and most likely many of the men under their 
command would indicate, in answering question 8 of Section C, that they suffered frequent 
exposure to loud noises during their deployment.  The frequency of bombing or shelling on 59
UN enclaves will be discussed at length in the following section on perceived threat. The 
comparison of DRRI-2 and the accounts of Karremans and Dallaire show that they were 
exposed to many stressors that originated from the daily environment in which they worked. 
Their descriptions show that they were in extremely uncomfortable conditions for months on 
end and that environment also became increasingly restricted as a physical space. Therefore, it 
 Ibid., 640.49
 Roméo Dallaire and Brent Beardsley, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (New York: Carroll 50
& Graf Publishers, 2005), 263–264.
 Note: This also implies that water was limited for the UN personnel inside the enclaves, both for showering and more 51
importantly, drinking. Dallaire describes that water was rationed for UN troops to a single glass a day for washing. 
For description see Dallaire and Beardsley, Shake Hands with the Devil, 263–264.
 Peter Raymont, dir., Shake Hands with the Devil: The Journey of Roméo Dallaire (White Pine Pictures and Investigative 52
Productions Inc., 2004), 00:54:55, accessed November 4, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=9CAOnJrxmKk.
 Ibid., 00:55:05.53
 Ibid., 00:54:59–00:55:45.54
 Dallaire comments in his biography: "Driving under a firefight is unnerving to say the least, especially in an 55
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certain level of risk attached, UN personnel and vehicles had the access and ability to move about on a daily basis. 
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is only logical that Karremans, Dallaire and any peacekeeper holding a position of command in 
Rwanda and Srebrenica would not entertain any options that would either prolong or intensify 
the desperate conditions that they were working in. This includes the decision made by 
Karremans to agree to a withdrawal of UN troops from the Srebrenica-Potočari compound on 
July 21, 1995. 
Perceived Threat
Section G of the DRRI-2 titled Deployment Concerns, focuses on the dangers that soldiers felt they 
were exposed to during their deployment.  There are several questions in this section that focus 60
on biological concerns such as infectious disease, medicines available, and exposure to NBCs 
which, from Karremans, Lemaire, and Dallaire’s accounts of UN deployment in Bosnia and 
Rwanda, are not discussed as primary points of concern. Due to that fact, I will not discuss 
threat of infectious disease or exposure to NBCs as stressors that impacted the spectrum of 
action in which the UN operated in. However, what UN peacekeepers’ accounts can attest to is 
the perceived threat from shelling, direct threats including assassination and in the case of 
Rwanda, other artillery such as Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), from various elements 
present in the two conflict zones. Through Dallaire and Karremans’ testimonies, it is apparent 
that even as a peacekeeping force, the lives of UN peacekeepers faced numerous threats during 
their deployment.
Karremans and the UN peacekeeping force in Srebrenica were aware, due to the 
restriction of movement in or out of the enclave due to bad weather and the Bosnian Serb 
blockade, that if the city was shelled, they would not be able to organize a timely evacuation.  61
Karreman's ICTY testimony demonstrates that he felt the conditions inside the enclave were 
inhumane and that due to the restriction of movement in or out of the enclave, refugees and UN 
personnel alike, were trapped inside the enclave.  Beginning on July 6, 1995, the city came 62
under direct assault by the VRS under the command of General Mladić. The area surrounding 
the enclave fell under heavy shelling from the artillery which completely surrounded the city. 
This lasted until July 11 when the UN enclave itself was shelled directly, constituting an 
immediate threat to the lives of all inside the enclave.  The shelling between July 6 and July 11 63
displaced an estimated 40,000 refugees,  roughly 19,000–25,000 of which fled to the Potočari 64
compound approximately six kilometers northwest of the city.  It is important to note that even 65
if the defense of the Srebrenica enclave was no longer attainable, that upon leaving, the UN’s 
mission was compromised not only in terms of their ability to protect refugees, but also by 
moving to a position which rendered them more vulnerable to attack.  In terms of UN troops 66
being able to respond with use of force to VRS attacks, the only option for Karremans at 
Srebrenica was to request close air support from NATO. During the period between July 6 and 
July 11, NATO only provided close air support starting at 2pm on July 11.  However, 67
 Ibid., 8.60
 See Karremans' statement regarding no freedom of movement either for his battalion or the general population, The 61
Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić, 636.
 Ibid.62
 Ibid., 639–640.63
 MSF International Movement, MSF and Srebrenica: 1993–2003, 53.64
 The Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić, 640–641.65
 It is also noted by Ryngaert, that upon leaving the Srebrenica enclave, UN peacekeepers no longer had jurisdiction 66
over refugees formerly in the Srebrenica enclave who did not remain with UN forces during the evacuation. These 
circumstances did contribute to the massacre of refugees from the Srebrenica enclave who did not go with UN 
troops to the new enclave at Potočari and instead attempted to hide in the surrounding area. See Ryngaert, 
Peacekeepers Facilitating, 503–504.
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Karremans testified that he felt NATO support was “too little, too late” and in fact, lead to 
further aggression and threats made by General Mladić to shell the enclave at Potočari.68
There are also numerous examples of threats and intimidation tactics which contributed 
to the perceived threat to the Dutchbat. In one of their meetings, General Mladić directly 
threatened to shell UN troops and the thousands of refugees under UN protection if Karremans 
was not able to stop NATO air strikes against the VRS.  Karremans’ testimony also indicates 69
that he felt Mladić had the military capability to carry out this threat and that there was no 
safety from Bosnian Serb shelling either at Srebrenica or later at the enclave at Potočari.  70
During their first meeting and even before, via radio communication, General Mladić indicated 
that if the air strikes against his troops were not stopped, he was willing to directly shell the UN 
compound and the immediate surrounding areas which risked not only mass refugee but UN 
casualties as well.  Mladić’s threat of shelling is also further confirmed by the Nederlands 71
Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (NIOD) report on Srebrenica. The NIOD report states that 
the VRS’s mortars and guns were directly visible from the entrance gate to the Potočari 
compound and would have caused “carnage among densely packed masses of refugees.”  72
These numerous factors left Karremans and the other UN troops both powerless and extremely 
vulnerable to attack because they had no effective means with which to engage the VRS if fired 
upon.73
At the critical point of evacuating refugees out of Potočari beginning on July 12, 
Dutchbat troops have been accused of “aiding” the separation of male refugees which 
ultimately allowed for the massacre of one hundred to four hundred men from the Potočari 
compound.  Very much so, the VRS forces controlled this event. Not only by design, through 74
ensuring that they provided the only transportation which could access the compound, but also 
by disarming UN troops during the evacuations. Going beyond simply forcing peacekeepers at 
gunpoint to discard their weapons and flak jackets, one VRS soldier “demonstrated” that the 
UN flak jackets could not stand up to their armor-piercing rounds.  So not only was there 75
physical disarming of UN troops, this one instance served as a further psychological 
reinforcement that even if they had this protection (which had now been removed from them), 
UN troops did not stand a chance in a combat situation against the VRS. If they did not comply 
with the evacuation of refugees under VRS terms, even if they witnessed the separation of able-
bodied men from refugee line-ups, there would be no barrier to them being eliminated should 
they resist.76
In Rwanda, General Dallaire believed the Interahamwe were emboldened by stories of 
how the UN presence as a peacekeeping force sent to protect the civilian population in Bosnia 
was essentially disregarded by Bosnian Serb forces. Dallaire also felt that the Interahamwe’s use 
of intimidation in attacking and even killing UN personnel was also a viable tactic to encourage 
 Ibid., 643–644.68
 Ibid.69
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requests that resulted in the Dutchbat being left powerless and vulnerable against the VRS. As previously 
discussed, Karremans described the NATO air strikes on the afternoon of July 11th as "too late and too little" and in 
fact, Karremans describes them as a factor which put UN soldiers and refugee lives at greater risk because of the 
response they provoked from General Mladić. See The Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić, 643.
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UN forces to withdraw rather than risk casualties.  Therefore, unlike in Bosnia, the 77
Interahamwe had no hesitation in directly targeting UN personnel with bombs, grenades, land 
mines and other forms of firepower. In his documentary, Dallaire casually laughs during his 
ten-year anniversary return to Rwanda “[e]ven driving down this road without someone taking 
pot shots at you is already an improvement.”  Dallaire also noted the fear among UN staff at 78
headquarters in Kigali when the building came under direct bombardment with grenades and 
machine gun fire starting in mid-April 1994. These bombardments carried on for months and 
extensively disrupted the day to day workings of the UN forces, as all personnel were forced to 
retreat to the ground floor of the UN headquarters building during the bombardments.79
Based on Dallaire’s account of the UN mission in Rwanda, there was an omnipresent 
threat to life due to unidentified persons, but almost certainly the Interahamwe, who fired at 
UN trucks whilst out on the streets performing their duties and also direct bombardment on the 
UN headquarters in Kigali. Another example of intimidation tactics used by the Interahamwe 
which was perceived as a threat to peacekeepers’ safety were described by Lemaire at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1997.  In his testimony, Lemaire 80
commented that during the period where refugees were gathering to the UN safe zone at the 
ETO (also referred to as the Don Bosco School), there was a constant presence by the 
Interahamwe monitoring their activities.  He noted that they would watch the enclave from the 81
crossroads 300-meters up the road from the school; and as time went on, those groups got 
bigger, up to fifteen people sometimes with weapons. In addition, vehicles full of Interahamwe 
would regularly drive by. Gunfire could be heard regularly in the area and was attributed to 
murders being committed by the Interahamwe. Lemaire himself described the presence of the 
Interahamwe as “being surrounded.”  For Lemaire, it is quite possible this perception of being 82
surrounded was fueled even further by the fact that unlike in Somalia, where Lemaire and a 
portion of his men had served, when enemy individuals approached in close proximity, UN 
troops could not fire at them if necessary.  In his ICTR testimony, Lemaire describes that the 83
rules of engagement for Rwanda put peacekeepers in close proximity to paramilitary forces, 
particularly at roadblocks, in highly threatening situations and that due to the rules of 
engagement, they were forced to yield in these situations. Lemaire felt that the new rules of 
engagement, which only allowed for use of force in cases of legal self-defense, resulted in less 
effective ways for the UN to carry out their mission and defend themselves. In this case, this 
change in the rules of engagement particularly if any UN troops had served in Somalia where 
they were heavily equipped and were authorized to use force if necessary, made the perception 
of being surrounded as powerful as if they had actually been encircled by paramilitaries.84
In addition to the threat that shelling posed to the lives of UN troops, another added 
piece of leverage that General Mladić and the VRS took over Karremans and the UN command 
was that they secured UN hostages.  The timeframe in which those hostages were taken 85
indicates that this move was strategically planned by the VRS. Between July 8 and July 10, 
General Mladić attacked numerous UN checkpoints near the UN enclave at Srebrenica, so by 
the time Karremans was ordered to his first meeting with Mladić, Mladić had 55 UN soldiers as 
hostages.  Naturally, the meetings with Karremans are significant because during those 86
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meetings on July 11 and 12, Karremans was informed that all Bosniak refugees would be 
forcibly evacuated from the region.  Furthermore, the targeted massacre against Bosniak men 87
and boys also began on July 12, two days after the UN hostages were secured. It is highly likely 
that if General Mladić’s intention to remove or ethnically cleanse the area of all Bosniak 
Muslims had been compromised, the lives of those UN hostages would have been under grave 
threat.  Therefore, it is clear that the lives of Karremans, his men stationed at the enclave in 88
Srebrenica, and the hostages, who were also under Karremans’ command were under grave 
threat by the VRS. By July 12, 1995, Karremans found himself and his unit surrounded, unable 
to carry out their orders, with no hope of backup or support and limited to no supplies. This 
fundamentally influenced his decision to comply with the forced evacuation of the remaining 
refugees by the VRS. This decision could be viewed as a withdrawal to a defensible location in 
order to save some of the refugees Karremans was charged with protecting. It is clear that at 
Srebrenica and possibly more so at Potočari, due to the operational constraints, rules of 
engagement and enemy threat, he would have had minimal success in protecting civilian lives 
or ensuring the safety of his men otherwise.89
In Rwanda, based on the accounts of Dallaire and supporting insight given by his 
Executive Assistant in Rwanda, Major Brent Beardsley, the perceived threat posed by the 
Interahamwe and other extremist factions, originated from the fact that they, in a matter of a 
day, were able to execute a series of seemingly well-planned murders of any government 
officials who could have soothed the mass tensions that had come to a head after the 
assassination of President Habyarimana.  This included both Hutu moderates and Tutsis 90
within government of which extremist forces within the military knew exactly where they and 
their families could be found and murdered within days, if not hours, of the President’s 
assassination.  Furthermore, extremist propaganda made it clear that there was a distinct anti-91
Belgian sentiment among the Interahamwe and other factions.  This resulted in a situation 92
where, unlike in Bosnia, UN soldiers were not just taken captive, they were tortured and killed. 
On April 7, 1994, ten Belgian peacekeepers were murdered by Major Bernard Ntuyahaga of the 
Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), despite the warning sent by Dallaire on January 11, 1994 to UN 
high command in New York expressly stating that there was a plot to murder Belgian troops.93
The murdered Belgian peacekeepers had been sent by Dallaire to guard the house of the 
Rwandan Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingimana, where they were disarmed and transported to 
 Ibid., 679–680. The timing of the capture of the 55 UN hostages is, of course, suspicious as it directly proceeded 87
Karremans and Mladić’s first meeting. The timing would suggest that the hostages were clear leverage so that 
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Camp Kigali and were murdered by Ntuyahaga the same day.  Dallaire’s command was 94
heavily criticized for not taking some kind of action to extract the Belgian hostages on April 7. 
However, Dallaire felt that he was in an impossible position. Dallaire believed if a UN force had 
gone in to rescue the ten Belgian peacekeepers being held hostage, he estimates that would have 
risked “twenty, thirty casualties and on top of that, they could just blast the shit out of my 
headquarters and my mission would have been over.”  This indicates that Dallaire did not feel 95
at the time that he had the manpower or the firepower to launch a rescue operation without 
risking casualties or opening himself up to an attack on his headquarters due to a lack of 
presence there. Furthermore, he felt that such a mission would not, due to the likely loss of life, 
be supported by the UN high command and its member states.96
The Interahamwe eventually became so emboldened that they threatened Dallaire 
himself as the Force Commander of UNAMIR in Rwanda and issued daily death threats that if 
he were seen by the Interahamwe, he was to be immediately stopped and killed. This not only 
threatened the life of Dallaire himself but also, he reports that any UN soldiers who fit his vague 
description were targeted and some narrowly escaped being killed before Dallaire could pull 
them off the streets.  The murder of the ten Belgian peacekeepers, the threats to numerous 97
peacekeepers while carrying out missions, and targeting Dallaire himself, indicates that UN 
troops had numerous reasons to perceive a grave threat to their own lives during their 
deployment in Rwanda.
Not only is it evident that the perceived threat to the safety of UN peacekeepers on the 
ground greatly limited the range of decisions that Dallaire felt he could make, it also directly 
impacted the perceived range of options that the UN and the international community had to 
intervene and to stop the genocide.  In its conception, the murder of the ten Belgian 98
peacekeepers on April 7, 1994 was intended to and ultimately lead to the withdrawal of UN 
forces from Rwanda.  As a political officer with the UN during the genocide, Michael Barnett 99
even went so far as to postulate that the UN took no affirmative action because of the risk it 
posed to the UN’s reputation by becoming further embroiled in an “ethnic conflict that spelled 
little possibility of success and only danger and failure.”  Two weeks of deliberation, debates, 100
statements, and recommendations for action suggested by Dallaire resulted in the opposite of 
any affirmative action; instead, the result was the withdrawal of bulk of UN peacekeepers from 
Rwanda on April 21, 1994. This decision made it very clear that the influence or action that the 
UN would exercise to prevent violence undertaken by the Interahamwe against Tutsi civilians 
in the months to follow would be very limited.  Barnett maintains that the UN’s decision to 101
maintain only a small token peacekeeping force was not made to protect civilian lives or to 
prevent genocide, in fact, it greatly limited the operational capabilities of peacekeepers on the 
ground. The small UN force who remained past early April 1994, remained to preserve self-
interest, to symbolize their continued concern and even to mask their unwillingness to send in 
an intervention force.  The lack of communication, withdrawal of the bulk of the UN 102
peacekeeping force and indecisiveness of the UN and its member states would have most 
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certainly increased the perceived threat and actual threat of the Interahamwe to Dallaire and 
UN troops on the ground.
During this period of indecision, lack of communication and endless political 
deliberation by the UN high command after the murder of the Belgian peacekeepers, Dallaire 
recounted the event of the Belgian withdrawal from the ETO on the outskirts of Kigali.  Today, 103
this event is one of the most well-known examples of how the perceived threat of the 
Interahamwe felt by UN peacekeepers directly lead to actions taken by peacekeepers to 
withdraw or remain passive in protecting Rwandan civilians during the genocide.  On April 104
11, 1994, 2,000 civilians who had gathered at the school with the belief that they could expect 
protection under the UN were murdered by the Interahamwe after Lemaire withdrew the 
Belgian-UN troops under his command. As commanding officer, Lemaire requested permission 
to withdraw to the airport.  Dallaire also believed that Lemaire purposefully did not inform 105
either his commanding officer in the Belgian forces or Dallaire that they were protecting 
Rwandan civilians at the site.  In describing the circumstances which Lemaire’s troops 106
operated under at the school and what lead to their withdrawal, Lemaire addressed numerous 
factors that presented a real threat to the troops under his command. These factors included the 
severe lack of personnel, the change in the rules of engagement, namely the order to not fire 
their weapons except when being fired upon and a lack of armored vehicles, heavy weaponry, 
and anti-tank missiles.  Lemaire believed all these elements played a role in why his troops 107
could not be effective in stopping massacres already taking place in early to mid-April.  It is 108
also important to note that while Lemaire’s decision to withdraw knowingly was undertaken at 
the cost of refugees’ lives, it is in part, a consequence of the orders guiding UNAMIR forces in 
Rwanda at the time. Peacekeepers’ role at this time was primarily to monitor and report the 
situation on the ground, act as mediators and to help uphold the Arusha Agreement under UN 
Resolution 872  and its extension under UN Resolution 909.109 110
In Rwanda, UN peacekeepers faced an added difficulty in identifying who was a 
member of the Interahamwe. Major Beardsley referred to it as the “third force.”  The 111
Government of the Rwandan Republic and the rebels, known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
were considered the first and second forces, the third force that Beardsley refers to was the 
Interahamwe. The first two powers in Rwanda agreed for peace with the Arusha Accords 
signed in 1993; however, the Interahamwe were described by Beardsley as the “youth-wing 
extremists” that were determined that the Arusha Agreement would not be implemented.  112
Dallaire confirmed that during the Rwandan Genocide were as young as fourteen and fifteen 
years old.  Thus, this indicates that members of Interahamwe were not a clearly defined 113
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 Raymont, Journey of Roméo Dallaire, 00:10:22–00:10:55.111
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enemy military force. They were a fraction of the local population, and when not in the 
Interahamwe’s brightly colored uniform, they were not readily identifiable as an enemy when 
in plain clothes, especially because they could include children among their ranks. These were 
local people, in many cases that turned against members of their own communities. In Lt. 
Lemaire’s testimony, he points out that in the days following President Habyarimana’s 
assassination, the UN command could not identify exactly who ordered the killing of the 
Belgian peacekeepers. Lemaire states that “these potential enemies could be FAR troops, 
gendarmerie elements or civilians who were working for Interahamwe because these people on 
several occasions individually or in groups in a joint manner put our troops, the Belgian troops 
in difficulty.”  Finally, he also discusses the challenges his troops faced in protecting the 114
refugees at the ETO. Lemaire believed that due to one significant aspect of the Rwandan 
Genocide, namely neighbors attacking neighbors looking to “settle their scores,” that 
paramilitaries would risk invading UN safe zones if it achieved the purpose of massacring 
those inside whom they felt had wronged them.115
Based on the testimonies of Dallaire, Lemaire, and Karremans, it is likely that the Dutch 
army stationed at Srebrenica-Potočari and the UN troops in Kigali, Rwanda would have 
responded negatively to all questions in Section G of the DRRI-2 that do not pertain to NBC’s, 
disease or pesticides comprising the following questions: 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12.  It is clear 116
that the UN felt that due to their lack of firepower and heavy artillery and additionally, the 
superior tactical positions that the VRS and the Interahamwe had, that the decisions the 
peacekeepers could make were greatly limited. Furthermore, in Rwanda, UN peacekeepers 
faced the added difficulty of the enemy being sometimes previously unidentified or non-
uniformed children, but who, nevertheless, were a threat to the lives of UN peacekeepers.  117
These stressors therefore indicate that decisions made by peacekeepers to protect civilians 
despite the risks to their own lives, were made through UN peacekeepers putting their 
exceptionally vulnerable circumstances aside. It also should not be taken lightly that in both 
cases where UN troops have been internationally accused of abandoning refugees to be 
massacred during the UN withdrawals from Srebrenica-Potočari and from the ETO school in 
Rwanda, that there was not simply a perceived threat, but a real and compounded threat to 
life.  In both cases, the enemy used hostages, direct threats, and showcased their immediate 118
armed presence by positioning themselves just outside the enclaves for all to see. Every day the 
UN spent being exposed to these stressors would have also been spent dealing with the reality 
that at any time, they would have no realistic way to defend themselves or the people under 
their blanket of protection. Furthermore, both UN forces had no reasonable expectation of 
rescue if the situation against them turned violent. This is a situation that few soldiers in 
modern military conflicts, let alone civilians have practical experience with.
Combat and Post-Combat Experiences
Section E of the DRRI-2 is concerned with post-battle experiences. Its goal is to ascertain to what 
degree a soldier was exposed to the suffering or death of civilians or fellow military personnel. 
The questions asked in this section take such lines of inquiry as to whether or not a veteran 
witnessed the death or dismemberment of either fellow soldiers or civilians, if they witnessed 
civilians begging, saw civilian homes or communities that had been destroyed, or if they 
handled human remains.  Both Karremans’ and Dallaire’s forces were deployed to Rwanda 119
 The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Rutaganda—Redacted Transcript, 130–131.114
 Ibid., 135.115
 Vogt et al., DRRI-2, 8.116
 Raymont, Journey of Roméo Dallaire, 00:13:53.117
 McGreal, What’s the Point of Peacekeepers?.118
 Note: This overview generalizes the lines of inquiry for all questions in section E, aside from questions 11 and 12, 119
which are not relevant to the experiences described by peacekeepers in Rwanda and Srebrenica. See Vogt et al., 
DRRI-2, 6.
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and Bosnia due to the presence of or perceived risk that mass human suffering was either 
imminent or already occurring in those regions as a result of civil war. This section will explore 
the instances where both UN forces, in their efforts to maintain UN enclaves or safe areas for 
displaced civilians, witnessed numerous examples of human suffering and death in their 
respective regions of deployment. In the case of Dallaire, he witnessed personally the aftermath 
of the murders of his own troops by the Interahamwe and assisted in the removal of disfigured 
civilian remains in Kigali.120
At the UN enclave in Srebrenica, the experiences of the UN were defined by the goal of 
the Bosnian Serb army to displace the Bosnian Muslim population and through depriving them 
of food, electricity, and medical supplies to force both the Muslim civilian population and 
peacekeeping operations to leave the region.  While we do not have a direct account from 121
Karremans himself on his personal experiences witnessing the aftermath of targeted attacks 
intended to displace and kill Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, we do have an idea of what those 
working in the Srebrenica enclave would have witnessed regarding this based on MSF 
accounts.  It is almost inevitable that UN troops stationed in Srebrenica witnessed the 122
displacement of thousands of people as the enclave was overwhelmed with displaced civilians 
either from the surrounding area or whose homes were destroyed by the shelling of the city. An 
area before the war which housed approximately 6,000 people now held around 23,000.  MSF 123
reports emphasize that these displaced civilians were entirely dependent on aid rations for 
survival, but also critically lacked water and adequate shelter from the heat or from the cold.  124
With only a fraction of aid shipments being allowed in by VRS, it is impossible to imagine that 
UN personnel stationed at Srebrenica did not witness instances of civilians begging for food or 
other assistance as MSF was operating under the protection of the UN within the enclave.  125
Furthermore, due to the shelling of the enclave, the evacuation to the enclave at Potočari and 
finally, the penultimate forced evacuations of all Bosnian Muslims to Tuzla, civilians seeking 
UN protection lost their homes, their belongings, and experienced their communities destroyed
—not once, but multiple times.  This indicates that UN personnel stationed at Srebrenica 126
would likely indicate a strong exposure to questions 1, 2, and 3 of section E which ask if they 
witnessed civilian suffering as an aftermath of war.
Stobbaerts also indicates that UN troops would have been exposed to severe injuries to 
civilians or civilian casualties. The MSF report indicates that by April of 1993 alone, five doctors 
at the hospital in Srebrenica had already performed almost four hundred amputations.  The 127
MSF team at Srebrenica received a steady stream of war-injured people throughout the over 
two-year period that they were posted in the area. However, when the enclave itself was 
targeted with heavy artillery, both the MSF team and UN personnel became direct witnesses to 
civilians being injured or killed. On July 6, 1995, a total of six rockets, 150 artillery, tank bombs, 
 After the bodies of the ten Belgian peacekeepers were recovered, Dallaire personally visited the morgue to view the 120
bodies. See Dallaire and Beardsley, Shake Hands with the Devil, 258. For further examples, see Raymont, Journey of 
Roméo Dallaire, 00:52:50–00:53:06; and Dallaire and Beardsley, Shake Hands with the Devil, 348.
 The Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić, 635–636.121
 For examples of accounts where MSF describe the number of wounded and providing medical relief following 122
instances of shelling or other attacks, please see MSF International Movement, MSF and Srebrenica: 1993–2003, 48 
and 51.
 Ibid., 36123
 Note that two press releases from MSF, the first from December 19, 1994 and the second from July 12, 1995 solidify 124
this overall picture of the conditions displaced civilians faced in the Srebrenica enclave. See Ibid., 37. See also Ibid., 
56–57.
 For example, looking at the MSF press release from December 19, 1994, it describes that with the amount of food 125
being allowed into the enclave, refugees were only receiving approximately 905 calories per day in the Srebrenica 
enclave, less than half of the normal recommended requirement. See Ibid., 37.
 For the MSF description of the shelling of the city of Srebrenica and the mass evacuation to Potočari please refer to 126
Ibid., 52–53. For further details on the forced evacuation of refugees to Tuzla please see Ibid., 55.
 Ibid., 21–22.127
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mortar bombs as well as countless shells were dropped on the city of Srebrenica, with two 
rockets exploding directly within the UN compound. By the end of the day, MSF reported that 
thirteen people were injured and four had been killed.  This demonstrates that UN personnel 128
in Srebrenica, though perhaps not as closely as MSF doctors and staff, would have also been 
exposed to civilians and possibly even their own personnel, being severely wounded, 
disfigured, or killed, especially when the enclave came under direct attack. These situations are 
represented by questions 4, 5, 10 and (possibly) question 7 of Section E of the DRRI-2.129
In Rwanda, unlike in Srebrenica, it is confirmed by General Dallaire that UN troops 
were also directly involved in the removal of bodies and regularly witnessed the aftermath of 
massacres against civilians. In his documentary, Dallaire discusses how the smell of corpses that 
had been left to rot in houses and scattered on the streets all over the city became so 
overwhelming that the UN could no longer do their job at headquarters due to the smell. In his 
biography, Dalliare describes the smell of the bodies and lingering aftermath of the massacres 
that were already taking place within the first five days of the genocide. He describes his 
memory of this in vivid detail: “The odour of death in the hot sun; the flies, maggots, rats and 
dogs that swarmed to feast on the dead. At times it seemed the smell had entered the pores of 
my skin.”  In order to continue on their duties, the UN had to gather the bodies from the area 130
surrounding the UN compound and burn them only a short distance away from 
headquarters.  Another instance where the UN forces in Rwanda directly witnessed the 131
aftermath of an attack on civilians was on May 1, 1994, at the protected site of the Sainte Famille 
church in Kigali. At Sainte Famille, a bomb fell in an area where thousands of civilians were 
seeking refuge in a UN protected part of the church compound. When Dallaire and his men 
arrived after the bomb fell, they witnessed a scene of devastation—“[s]evered limbs and heads, 
children ripped in two, the wounded turning their bewildered eyes toward you at the moment 
at which you can actually see the life expire from them, the smell of burnt explosives mixed 
with burning blood and flesh.”  Hundreds of civilians turned to Dallaire for answers, rescue, 132
and for the UN to protect them. These two accounts are some examples of numerous instances 
where General Dallaire and his men directly witnessed the destruction of homes and 
communities, saw the severe disfigurement of civilians, the bodies of dead civilians, and were 
involved with the removal of human remains. This indicates that Dallaire’s immediate 
command in Kigali would have also responded negatively to questions 3, 8, 9, and 13 of Section 
E of the DRRI-2.133
One instance described by General Dallaire also indicates that he and other UN troops 
under his command would also respond affirmatively to many questions in Section D of the 
DRRI-2 titled Combat Experiences. In his biography, Dallaire describes an attack on a UN patrol 
in June 1994. Dallaire was called to an incident where two of his men had been wounded when 
their vehicle was believed to have hit a landmine and were then fired on again while trying to 
extract themselves from the vehicle.  Later, the wounded UN troops were detained by the 134
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), who were allies of the UN in stopping the genocide. The UN 
soldiers were robbed by members of the RPF and one UN soldier was minutes from being taken 
away and killed. Later, the more severely injured soldier, Major Manuel Soza, became the 
 It is also important to note that the MSF team logbook noted that “[t]he number of dead people will be probably 128
much higher since they don’t arrive at the hospital.” See Ibid., 48.
 Vogt et al., DRRI-2, 6. In Rwanda, as shown with the previous discussion of the conditions at the Amahoro Stadium 129
and Sainte Famille safe zones (see following paragraph), the UN peacekeepers deployed in Rwanda would have 
experienced similar suffering among civilians due to the aftermath of war. Therefore, they also would then express 
similar responses to questions 4, 5, and 10 as the Bosnian UN peacekeepers.
 Dallaire and Beardsley, Shake Hands with the Devil, 289.130
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twelfth UN soldier to die during his deployment in Rwanda.  It was later confirmed by RPF 135
leader and future President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, that the attack on Dallaire’s men had 
been carried out by the RPF, which constitutes as “friendly” fire.  This incident from June 1994 136
and Dallaire’s previous wry comment indicating the frequency of shots fired at UN vehicles in 
Kigali, indicate that certain UN personnel in Rwanda would likely report exposure, if not 
frequent exposure, to the situations indicated by the following questions in Section D of the 
DRRI-2: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, and 11.137
The situations discussed in this section involving the exposure of UN troops in Rwanda 
and Srebrenica to the suffering, injury, and death of civilians as well as fellow peacekeepers 
have various implications for their mental wellbeing. One implication is these experiences can 
trigger a sense of danger and heightened risk reminding peacekeepers that they worked in a 
daily environment where the risk to their own life was quite high. Furthermore, every dead, 
maimed, desperate, displaced, starving, or dehydrated individual could also be a reminder of 
the failure of UN troops in carrying out their mandate to protect and preserve lives within the 
safe zones. Herein lies one of the great limitations of not having a set of scales like the DRRI-2 
Scales specifically tailored to UN peacekeeping missions. With both sets of DRRI scales having 
been written to assess the impact of conditions and circumstances faced by the US military in 
the Middle Eastern theatre,  there are numerous aspects of the scales which are not applicable 138
or do not adequately address key deployment-related factors which were also a source of stress 
and therefore limited the range of decisions possible for UN peacekeepers. One example 
discussed in this section is the politics of preservation that stemmed from UN use of force in 
Somalia, particularly with the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, which lead the UN security council 
to review the authorization to use force to coerce cooperation.  The negative impact of the UN 139
peacekeeping mission in Somalia heavily dictated a change in the rules of engagement that 
peacekeepers would be expected to operate under in Srebrenica and Rwanda, which was 
namely, to use persuasion rather than force to achieve their missions.  However, Lemaire 140
expressed several times in his ICTR testimony that he felt the change in the rules of engagement 
and the unwillingness of the UN to heavily arm its troops in Rwanda had a profound negative 
impact on their ability to carry out their mission and stop the genocide.  Lemaire also 141
describes that he felt Dallaire’s recommendations as to the number of troops needed and critical 
recommendations to the UN in New York to change the rules of engagement to allow the 
peacekeepers to intervene and stop the distribution of weapons were ignored.  142
Fundamentally, the unwillingness of the UN to allow for use of force in certain situations and 
the numerous examples of the UN and member states’ failure to provide timely military 
support when requested left peacekeepers surrounded and unable to adequately defend 
themselves if they came under attack.  The overriding political concerns of the UN and its 143
member states in the 1990s provided an insurmountable obstacle to the success of peacekeepers 
in protecting safe zones and the people within them. These types of stressors have the 
possibility for many individuals to develop feelings of self-doubt, a negative view of the UN 
whom they looked to for leadership, support, relief and the blanket blue helmet protection, 
hopelessness, exhaustion, hyper-vigilance, and of course, fear for their safety which would have 
all greatly impacted their decisions in the field. Without the security or even possibility of relief 
 Ibid., 424.135
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forces, adequate weapons, or supportive military maneuvers and under the kinds of daily 
conditions described in this article, can we have reasonably expected peacekeepers to have 
made different decisions that would have prevented genocide from taking place? Could we 
have expected them to remain in indefensible areas, surrounded by enemy fire and where 
peacekeepers themselves were, on certain occasions, directly targeted and would have been 
killed if they had taken any action to prevent massacres from occurring? Was it possible to 
expect this under conditions which are known to make soldiers in other cases, who are able to 
use force if necessary, seriously vulnerable to developing serious and long-term mental health 
problems?
Conclusion
The DRRI-2 Scales and other diagnostic tools for assessing risk or resilience to developing PTSD 
provide an invaluable tool for researchers seeking to better understand the human agency 
behind traumatic events such as genocide. By applying the DRRI-2 Scales to the experiences of 
UN peacekeeping forces in Rwanda and Srebrenica, we can better understand how the daily 
conditions during their deployment negatively impacted their mental state and the range of 
perceived options they could take under those conditions to protect civilian lives. Through 
analyzing those daily conditions and comparing them to various questions from the sections of 
the DRRI-2 Scales that specifically focus on deployment stressors, we are able to break down the 
experiences that the UN peacekeepers had during their deployment to understand their 
cumulative negative impact on the mental health of peacekeepers. However, the use of these 
scales does have certain limitations in terms of how much they can contribute to understanding 
the particular conditions and limitations that peacekeepers faced in Rwanda and Srebrenica. 
What it should prompt however, is the development of certain frameworks of analysis that 
consider factors such as daily living conditions, sustained exposure to combat environments, 
exposure to injured or wounded persons, operational limitations, and perceived threat to life 
when judging those who witness acts of violence, massacres, or genocide taking place. We 
expected the UN peacekeepers in Rwanda and Srebrenica to have stopped or prevented acts of 
genocide, but was it actually possible for them even as soldiers to achieve this under those 
circumstances? In truth, we expected trained soldiers with inadequate ability to subdue enemy 
threats in highly dangerous, stressful, and ultimately indefensible positions to somehow 
overcome these circumstances and make decisions that would have put their lives and possibly 
the lives of those under their protection at risk with little chance of success.
It is clear that the mental health of UN peacekeepers, which shaped the decisions they 
made on the ground, faced multi-layered and persistent sources of stress that had to be 
managed on a daily basis. The eyewitness testimonies explored in this article have shown the 
daily conditions in which UN peacekeepers operated was a persistent source of stress. These 
included lack of water, food, sleep, freedom of movement, and also exposure to horrendous 
smells, including that of rotting corpses and loud noises from artillery fire. UN peacekeepers in 
Rwanda and Srebrenica were forced to try to carry out their mandate whilst operating under 
these conditions for months on end with no relief and no area to retreat to for rest. Additionally, 
UN personnel were faced with the daily reality that carrying out their mandate to protect put 
their own lives directly at risk. In Bosnia, the primary threat to life for UN peacekeepers was 
mainly the bombing or shelling of the surrounding city, later escalating to target the UN enclave 
itself. In Rwanda, threats to life came from numerous sources including the bombing of the UN 
headquarters, land mines, and deliberate targeting of UN peacekeepers on patrol and other 
daily threats and intimidation. In both cases, UN peacekeepers were also taken hostage for 
purposes of gaining leverage over UN decision-making; however, in Rwanda, peacekeepers 
were executed as a further threat to the remaining peacekeepers and to prompt the withdrawal 
of international troops. Additionally, the safety of UN peacekeepers and those they sought 
protect were under constant threat due to the fact that both peacekeeping operations were 
undermanned, under-equipped, and were greatly restricted in the acts they could take to 
defend themselves, the safe zones, and the civilians inside. Finally, UN peacekeepers regularly 
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saw the severe injury, desperation, death, and displacement of civilians who were the victims of 
civil war and genocide. They faced the daily reality of only being able to partly carry out their 
mandates to protect and help civilians due to numerous operational constraints and lack of 
support from the higher echelons of UN command and its member-states. In the case of 
Rwanda, UN peacekeepers witnessed and even were forced to handle the corpses of murdered 
Rwandans and in some cases, their own men, with shocking regularity and intensity. It is my 
opinion that anyone seeking to critique the actions or non-actions of UN peacekeepers in 
Rwanda and Srebrenica should re-examine their conclusions based on the current research and 
headways made in understanding the implications of multi-layered stress that soldiers to 
varying degrees experience in conflict zones and the risk that this poses to the mental health of 
the individual. 
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